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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GRANT ERCANBRACK 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
CRANDALL-WALKER MOTOR 
COMPANY, INC' 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 14, 298 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case involves the question as to the validity of a written 
document titled ,fVehicle Buyer 's Order, n as a contract of sale between 
the part ies . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Summit County, State of Utah, held that 
the "Vehicle Buyer 's Ordern was not a valid contract as between the 
par t ies , since it had not been accepted by the sales manager or an 
officer of the defendant company, and granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint. 
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Case No. 14, 298 (ms) * 
4 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the filling of the Distr ict Court 
upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 25th day of October 1973, the plaintiff executed a 
11
 Vehicle Buyer !s Order" for the purchase of a new 1974 Ford truck 
(P Ex. 1). The document provided on its face the following statement: 
"This order is not valid unless signed or accepted by sales manager, 
or officer of the company. 
The lower court found from the evidence that neither the 
sales manager nor an officer of the company had accepted the order 
presented by the plaintiff, and that therefore no contract was entered into 
between the part ies . During the next several months, plaintiff continued 
to talk to the defendant's salesman, Gordon Taylor, relative to the truck 
offer. 
The evidence showed that in December 1974, the defendant 
company placed an order for a pickup truck for Lincoln Leasing Company 
(D Ex. 10). On May 23, 1973, the Lincoln Leasing Company orders were 
delivered to the defendant company and, in order to avoid a problem with 
the plaintiff, defendant's sales manager and officer offered that truck to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the plaintiff, in an attempt to resolve the apparent dispute that existed. 
The plaintiff refused to take the new truck because of its increased 
pr ice . 
Defendants sales manager and officer, George Crandall, J r . , 
testified that he had not accepted the offer of the plaintiff when it was 
made, because of the proposed purchase price of the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHEN SIGNING A CONTRACT IS A CONDITION PRE-
CEDENT TO FORMATION, NO CONTRACT IS FORMED UNTIL THE 
SIGNING. 
To form a valid contract, an offer must be accepted. The 
par t ies thereto must reach agreement. Furthermore, a contract must 
be accepted, without qualification, by one party thereto having a right to 
accept the offer. Hartzell v. Choctaw Lumber Co., 163 Okla. 240, 
22 P . 2d 387 (1933). 
(A) THERE WAS NO CONTRACT FORMED, BECAUSE 
THE TERMS OF THE DOCUMENT ARE CLEAR, AND MUST BE 
ENFORCED. 
The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is not 
contractual, but is merely one where plaintiff is making the offer, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the defendant is being asked to accept the offer, not the r eve r se . Such 
a relationship is apparent from the title of the document - "Vehicle 
Buyer ' s Order" - and by the instructions below the approval line for the 
sales manager !s signature, which state: "This order is not valid unless 
signed as accepted here by sales manager or officer of the company, "• 
Plaintiff is charged with knowledge of this writing, as well 
as all other unambiguous language in the order form. Plaintiff's desire 
to turn the order form into a contract is not supported by the language 
of the document, any signatures whatsoever, delivery of document, or 
the case law regarding these part icular i ssues . 
By the express t e rms of the Vehicle Buyer 's Order, the 
par t ies to the agreement have made signing a condition precedent to their 
being bound. Where such is the case, no contract i s formed until both 
par t ies have signed, although all other t e rms of the agreement may have 
been agreed upon. Summers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 Wyo. 369, 
75 P . 2d 937 (1938). Without signing by either the plaintiff, salesman or 
sales manager, there is no indication from the document that the minds 
of the part ies have met, creating an enforceable contract whose breach 
creates a cause of action. 
The beginning point in interpreting a contract is an examination 
of the language used in accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of 
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those words. Only in the case of uncertainty may background circumstances 
be considered. The intent of the document is clear - no contract is formed 
without a signing which indicates approval by the sales manager. Where 
the intent and purpose of a document can be ascertained, such document 
should be enforced according to the substance of the writing, Nagle v. 
Club Fountainbleu, 17 Ut. 2d 125, 405 P. 2d 346 (1965). 
In Nagle, supra, the court made a determination that, in a 
contractor 's suit seeking payment for construction services, the document 
signed by the part ies, by its te rms, was enforceable as a mortgage with 
liquidated damages, regardless of plaintiff's impression to the contrary. 
This restriction, requiring intent to be determined from a 
document, was further defined in Continental Bank and Trust Co. vs. 
Bybee, 6 U t 2d 98, 306 P . 2d 773 (1957), where the court, confronted 
with an action on a note drafted by defendant attorney, said: 
!fThe sole question before this court, then, is whether 
the part ies intended by this agreement that respondent 
should assume the obligation on the note held by 
Continental Bank. This intent should be ascertained 
first from the four corners of the instrument ins elf, 
second from other contemporaneous writings concerning 
the same subject matter, and third from the extrinsic 
parol evidence of the intentions. Mathis v. Madsen, 
1 Utah 2d-46, 261 P. 2d 952. If the ambiguity can be 
reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of the 
instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed. 
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 P. 107; 
Jensen v. Kidman, 85 Utah 27, 38 P. 2d 303. fl 
Id at 775 (Emphasis mine). 
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If a determination of party intent can be made from the 
instrument, a rb i t rary rules of law as to construction by contemporaneous 
writings or parol evidence will not be invoked. Western Development Co. 
v, Nell, 4 Ut. 2d 112, 288 P# 2d 452 (1955). 
Viewed in i ts entirety, the buyer 's order form is merely a 
proposal to enter into a contract* As such, without buyer 's signature, it 
i s not binding, even though accepted. Cox v. Denton, 104 Kan. 516, 
180 P . 261 (1919), Williston, Contracts, Third Edition, Section 27. The 
definition of a proposal to enter into a contract was set forth in Martin v. 
Ore. Ins. Co., 232 Ore. 197, 375 P . 2d 75 (1962), where the court defined 
a proposal to enter into a contract as an offer which may or may not be 
accepted by the party issuing the invitation. 
This court has previously held that intention of the part ies to, 
and the meaning of a contract, are to be deduced from the language and 
contents of the document; where such te rms are unambiguous, the 
agreement is conclusive. Plain City Irrigation Co. vs. Hooper Irrigation 
Co. , 1 Ut. 2d 188, 356 P. 2d 625 (1960). 
(B) THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PREVENTS ENFORCEMENT 
OF ANY ORAL AGREEMENT TO SELL OR PURCHASE THE AUTOMOBILE. 
Plaintiff attempts to create a written contract by evidence of 
oral representations. Such a result is not permissible. Laughlin v. 
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Haberfelde, 72 C. A. 2d 780, 165 P . 2d 544 (1946). 
Where the Statute of Frauds is in force and controlling, a 
written agreement may not be modified by oral representations. Wilson 
v. Gardner, 10 Ut. 2d 89, 348 P . 2d 931 (1960). 
Regardless of defendant's agent's representation, the instant 
agreement cannot be enforced. Utah Code Annotated 70A-2-201 provides: 
Formal requirements - Statute of Frauds - (1). Except 
as otherwise provided in this section, a contract for the 
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
enforceable byway of action or defense unless there 
i s some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract 
for sale has been made between the parties and signed 
by the party against whom enforcement is sought, or by 
his authorized agent or broker, (Emphasis mine). 
Such provision is a codification of the necessity of writing, 
created by the common law. In jurisdictions where a statute requires 
such a writing, oral contracts are unenforceable. PLC Landscape 
Construction v. Picadilly Fish NT Chips, 28 Ut. 2d 350, 502 P . 2d 562 
(1972). 
In Landscape, supra, the court pointed out: 
Except where a change, modification, or addition to a 
contract may conflict with the rule against varying a 
written contract by parol, there is no reason why 
parties cannot subsequently change their agreement. 
Id at 563. 
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V ^ C X K J V ^ i i v x . j . - . , 
By parity of reasoning, the reverse is true - when a rule 
i s controlling, forbidding oral changes, the parties may not orally 
change the wording of the document, nor is oral amplification of the 
writing permissible. The Uniform Commercial Code prohibits such use 
of parol evidence: 
70A-2-202: Final written expression - parol or extensive 
evidence - Te rms with respect to which the conformity 
memoranda of the part ies agree or which are otherwise 
set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement, with respect to such 
t e rms as are included therein, may not be contradicted 
by evidence of any pr ior agreements, or of a contemporaneous 
oral agreement, but may be explained or supplemented (a) by 
course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205), or 
by course of performance (Section 70A-2-208); and (b) by 
evidence of consistent additional te rms, unless the court 
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete 
and exclusive statement of the te rms of the agreement. 
(Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
Plaintiff does not seek to show a course of dealing, usage of 
t rade, or course of performance, because these do not support his 
understanding. Great care is taken in the industry to bind the buyer, 
as well as the dealer. A signing evidencing such a contract is , by usage 
of t rade, mandatory. Such is absent here, and no oral contract or 
modification was formed. 
Neither may plaintiff enlist the aid of the court to add additional 
t e r m s , because the t e rms of the writing are clear and exclusive. This is 
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also supported by controlling case law. In Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Ut. 2d 
89, 348 P . 2d 931 (1960), the court stated: 
, fThere is no question that the parties may orally 
modify an agreement in writing not within the 
Statute of Frauds, at least where there is 
consideration. " Id at 933 (Emphasis mine). 
The existence, in the present case, of a statutory provision 
to the contrary, the instant writing may not be orally accepted. 
Defendant submits that there is no basis for a determination 
that a contract has been formed in the instant case. Since defendant 
himself, under the facts of the case, could not have formed a contract, 
neither can his agent. Plaintiff1 s reliance upon agency law as creating 
a contract by silence and implied agency, therefore, is futile. The issue 
is not agency, but whether a contract has been formed, and whether such 
can be determined by the court. Under the law, as set forth, defendant 
submits that no contract has been formed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
AN AGENT CANNOT ORALLY BIND HIS PRINCIPAL TO A 
CONTRACT UNDERSTOOD BY THE OTHER PARTY TO REQUIRE THE 
SIGNATURE OF THE PRINCIPAL. 
The offer herein, unsigned by either party, cannot be accepted, 
by its terms, by an agent's oral representations. The signing and delivery 
of the order is necessary to form a binding contract. 
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It is clear under the writing, which plaintiff must be held 
to have read, that defendants salesman cannot orally represent an 
acceptance. In Naujoks v. Suhrmann, 9 Ut. 2d 84, 337 P . 2d 967 (1959), 
the court limited the scope of agency, while finding agency to fall within 
the limitation: 
"The fact that one may be an agent for one purpose 
does not make him an agent for every purpose, but 
agency is limited to acts within scope of authorized 
duties. n Id at 969. 
The authorized duties of defendant's agent-salesman do not 
include what plaintiff s t resses - the ability to orally bind the defendant 
without delivery of a signed order form approved by defendant's sales 
manager. 
ARGUMENT • 
POINT IE 
ONE IS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES, IF A VALID 
CONTRACT WAS FORMED, WHEN THE EXPRESS CONDITIONS OF THE 
WRITING LIMIT DAMAGES. 
The te rms set forth on the reverse side of Vehicle BuyerTs 
Order, entitled "Conditions11, indicate in writing that an additional price 
may be charged for the vehicle, if a price increase has occurred prior 
to delivery. Plaintiff herein seeks, by parol evidence, to have the court 
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grant him damages because of the price increase of the vehicle he 
desired to have. Such an attempt is contrary to the expr.ess conditions 
which the plaintiff must be held to have understood at the time of the 
making of the offer for the defendants acceptance. 
The pertinent terms are as follows: 
1. The manufacturer has reserved the right to change 
the list price of new motor vehicles without notice, and 
in the event that the list price of the new vehicle ordered 
hereunder is so changed, the cash delivered price, which 
is based on list price effective on the day of delivery, 
will govern in this transaction. But if such cash delivered 
price is increased the buyer may, if dissatisfied with such 
increased price, cancel this order, in which event, if a 
used vehicle has been traded in as a par t of the consider-
ation herein, such used vehicle shall be returned to the 
buyer upon the payment of a reasonable charge for 
storage and repairs (if any) or, if the used vehicle has 
been previously sold by the- dealer, the amount received 
therefor, less a selling commission of 15 percent, and 
any expense incurred in storing, insuring, conditioning 
or advertising said vehicle for sale, shall be returned to 
the buyer. 
Defendant has previously pointed out the burden one has when 
seeking enforcement or modification of a writing, clear and unambiguous 
in terms. The intent of the parties must be determined by the writing 
Defendant s t resses that business contracts are to be construed 
in the same sense uniformly attached to them by the business world. 
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Carroll Construction Co. v. Smith, 157 Wash. 2d 322, 223 P. 2d 606 (1950). 
The clear, unambiguous te rms on the reverse side of the 
Vehicle Buyer*s Order, clearly understood by the business world, indicate 
that defendant must, when the vehicle a r r ives , change the increased price. 
Such being the situation in the instant case, plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover damages under the guise of covering his loss . 
SUMMARY 
The Buyer Vehicle Order form at issue must be enforced by 
i ts t e rms . The Statute of Frauds prevents oral acceptance of the writing. 
The t e rms of the writing are clear and unambiguous - requiring 
judicial construction to determine intent. A binding contract cannot be 
formed from the order unless it is signed by the buyer and salesman, and 
is approved by the sales manager. No contract was thus formed in this case. 
Plaintiff cannot recover damages, contrary to the te rms of 
the writing, for alleged breach of an oral offer not accepted. The statutory 
and case law forbids it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
i 
WALTER R. EL.LETT 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Crandall-Walker Motor Company, Inc.. , 
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